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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this criminal case, Vincent K. Graham appeals from 
the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to charges of 
conspiracy involving counterfeit securities and other related 
charges pertaining to a scheme to defraud financial institutions. 
Specifically, Graham asks us to decide whether the district court 
incorrectly imposed restitution, pursuant to the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982), in light 
of his financial inability to pay restitution.  Because the 
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district court, utilizing the current AO Form 245B which has 
subsequently been changed,0 indicated that the restitution 
payments were to be made in installments which the probation 
officer could establish and periodically modify, Graham contends 
that the district court improperly delegated, to the probation 
office, the authority to designate the timing and amount of 
restitution payments.   
 In addition, Graham asserts that his sentencing hearing 
was improperly tainted by information proffered to the court at 
the sentencing hearing of Graham's co-defendant.  Finally, we are 
asked to address whether Graham's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was denied as a result of the district court's allegedly 
inadequate compensation of Graham's court appointed counsel 
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d). 
 We hold that the district court did not make the 
necessary factual finding regarding Graham's financial ability to 
comply with the restitution order and that AO Form 245B 
improperly delegates to the probation office the determination of 
the amount and timing of restitution installment payments.  We 
will thus vacate the judgment of the district court and remand 
for further proceedings.  We will dismiss the Criminal Justice 
Act claim, couched as a violation of Graham's Sixth Amendment 
right, for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
                                                           
0
 Because this form may still be in use in some of the 
district courts, we write to address this issue. 
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I. 
 On or about December 9, 1992, David L. Wells and 
Vincent K. Graham were arrested at a branch of the Meridian Bank 
located in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, while attempting to 
withdraw money from an automatic teller machine.  Pursuant to a 
fraudulent scheme devised by Graham, Graham and his co-
conspirators passed counterfeit, forged bank checks by depositing 
them in "dummy" bank accounts and withdrawing the proceeds before 
the financial institutions were able to discover the fraud.  In 
order to effectuate this scheme, Graham and his co-defendants 
placed advertisements in various newspapers soliciting the 
general public to submit personal information in application for 
employment with a fictitious company, "Transport Video East." 
Graham and his co-conspirators established accounts with various 
telephone answering services located in Pennsylvania, to receive 
the telephone calls and applications in response to the various 
solicitations as well as inquiries from the general public about 
the non-existent jobs.  When applicants inquired about the 
advertised jobs, they were asked to provide personal information 
such as social security numbers, driver's license numbers, etc., 
which Graham and the others subsequently used to create duplicate 
drivers licenses and other forms of fraudulent identification. 
 Using this false identification, Graham and his co-
conspirators opened bank accounts at various financial 
institutions.  Typically, the bank accounts were opened through 
the mail using the fraudulently obtained names and personal 
information of the unsuspecting job applicants.  By securing post 
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office boxes with private postal services, Graham and his co-
conspirators were able to obtain addresses for the bank accounts. 
Utilizing this fraudulent scheme, Graham and his co-conspirators 
deposited counterfeit checks totalling $162,000 into the various 
bank accounts.  They then withdrew or attempted to withdraw the 
funds prior to the discovery of the fraudulent nature of the 
transactions.  According to the government, an aggregate amount 
of $46,792.91 was withdrawn by Graham and his co-conspirators. 
 On August 17, 1993, a second superseding indictment was 
filed charging Vincent K. Graham and two others with conspiracy 
to make and utter counterfeit securities in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371 (1 count); making and uttering counterfeit 
securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) (40 counts); bank 
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) (14 counts); misuse of 
social security documents in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) 
(18 counts); possession of false identification documents in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3) (2 counts); and aiding and 
abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.  On September 10, 1993, 
pursuant to a written plea agreement, Graham pled guilty to 23 
counts of the sixty-three count indictment.  The remaining counts 
were dismissed on the government's motion.   
 Subsequently, Graham was sentenced to a term of forty-
six months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, 
followed by a term of three years of supervised release.  The 
district court also ordered Graham to pay a special assessment of 
$1,300 and to pay restitution in the amount of $46,692.91, 
jointly and severally with his co-defendants, in installments to 
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be established by the probation officer.  We turn to Graham's 
assertion that this order was inappropriate in light of his 
inability to make restitution in the amount ordered by the court.  
II. 
 Restitution is authorized by the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a), as incorporated into the 
Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1.  Section 3663(a)(1) 
provides that "The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted 
of an offense under this title . . ., may order, in addition to 
. . . any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant 
make restitution to any victim of the offense."  Section 3664(a) 
requires that the court "consider the amount of the loss 
sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial 
resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning 
ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such 
other factors as the court deems appropriate."  18 U.S.C. 
§3664(a).  See also United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 
1423 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 
(3d Cir. 1987).  We exercise plenary review over whether an award 
of restitution is permitted under law, but we review specific 
awards for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Seligsohn, 
supra, 981 F.2d at 1421; United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535 (3d 
Cir.) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 488 (1994). 
A. 
  In applying the restitution provisions of the Victim 
and Witness Protection Act, district courts must make specific 
findings regarding the factual issues that are relevant to the 
7 
Act.  United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  In United States v. Logar, we identified the necessary 
factual findings:  (1) the amount of loss, (2) the defendant's 
ability to pay and the financial needs of the defendant and the 
defendant's dependents, and (3) the relationship between the 
restitution imposed and the loss caused by the defendant's 
conduct.  Logar, 975 F.2 at 961.  The government has the burden 
of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of 
loss sustained by a victim.  United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d at 
480; 18 U.S.C. § 3580(d).  The defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating, also by a preponderance of the evidence, his 
financial needs and resources.  Id.  Indigency at the time of 
sentencing is not a bar to ordering the appellant to pay 
restitution.  United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 827 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 216 (1994) (citing 
United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 962 (3d Cir. 1992)).  "The 
order of restitution, on the other hand, may not be based on some 
future fortuitous event that may befall the appellant, but must 
be based on realistic expectations."  Id. 
 Here the government agrees with Graham that, under 
Logar, supra, the district court was required to make specific 
findings regarding Graham's ability to pay restitution.  The 
government concedes that this was not done.0  Accordingly, we 
                                                           
0
 The only explicit finding that the district judge made 
regarding Graham's financial capacity was in connection with 
Graham's ability to pay a fine.  The district court, declining to 
impose a fine, stated:  "I don't believe you can pay a fine so 
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will remand the order of restitution to the district court so 
that this finding can be made.  In addition, on remand, the 
district court should make specific findings of fact not only 
concerning Graham's current financial status but also on his 
ability to earn income in the future before the court sets an 
appropriate amount of restitution, if any.0  See United States v. 
Logar, 975 F.2d at 963. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
I'm not imposing a fine."  (App. 64).  It is anomalous that the 
district court concluded that Graham would be able to pay 
approximately $46,000.00 in restitution if he is unable to pay 
any fine, even in installments.  Perhaps the district court found 
that Graham would be unable to pay a fine in light of the amount 
of restitution that Graham was ordered to make.  In any event, 
the lack of record findings makes these claims difficult to 
review.   
0
 The presentence report summarizing Graham's educational 
and vocational skills and his employment history indicated that 
Graham completed a personal financial statement which did not 
reveal any assets, but set forth liabilities of $3,600 and 
indicated that since he has been incarcerated, Graham has had no 
income or expenses.  The presentence report indicated, however, 
that Graham has stated the he realized about $4,000 from his 
involvement in this case and that he used this money for living 
expenses.   
 
 The government asserts that Graham may have assets that 
are secreted.  Graham and his conspirators received approximately 
$46,000 as a result of their fraudulent scheme.  This money has 
not been recovered.  Thus, on remand the court could determine 
that there were assets that were secreted, provided that there is 
evidence to support such a finding.   
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B. 
 On remand, the district court must also designate the 
timing and amount of the restitution payments.  Pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3663(f)(1), in ordering restitution, "The court may 
require that such defendant make restitution under this section 
within a specified period or in specified installments."0 
 Utilizing AO Form 245B (Rev. 7/92), entitled Judgment 
in a Criminal Case, the district court indicated, by placing an 
"X" in the appropriate box, that the schedule of restitution 
payments were to be made "in installments which the probation 
officer shall establish and may periodically modify provided that 
the entire financial penalty is paid no later than five years 
after release from incarceration . . . ."0  We agree with the 
government, and with Graham, that the district court, in this 
manner, improperly delegated to the probation officer the 
determination of the timing of the restitution installment 
                                                           
0
 We do not read section 3663 as requiring that a judge 
establish a payment schedule.  On the contrary, 18 U.S.C. 
§3663(f)(1) does not require courts to establish schedules of any 
kind.  Thus, a court is free to order that restitution be made in 
a lump sum payment, if appropriate.  
0
 We are aware that AO Form 245B has been revised and 
that the latest version of this form is dated 3/95.  This new 
form does not contain these provisions that allow delegation of 
the determination of the schedule of payments.  The U.S. Attorney 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (who was advised by the 
Senior Deputy Chief U.S. Probation Officer) has informed us that 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
continues to use the old form for its judgment and commitment 
orders, and will continue to do so until training is provided by 
the National Fines Center.  Although it is anticipated that the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania will receive its training in 
April 1996, until this time, the district courts should not 
utilize this form in such a manner as to delegate the timing and 
amount of restitution payments to the probation officer. 
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payments.  While the district court is always free to receive and 
consider recommendations from the probation officer in this 
regard, we believe that section 3663 does not permit a district 
judge to delegate to the administrative staff these 
specifications.  So, too, must the court determine the extent to 
which payment may be deferred.  Accord United States v. Albro, 32 
F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ahmad, 2 F.3d 245 (7th 
Cir. 1993).  
 
C. 
 Finally, Graham contends that the district court failed 
to determine the appropriate amount of restitution.  Graham 
suggests that the district court erred in its determination of 
the amount of restitution because the court relied on the 
probation officer's calculations of the amount of the loss, 
rather than personally reviewing or examining the underlying 
evidence.   
 In United States v. Logar, we held that, 
notwithstanding estimates of loss in a presentence report, the 
district judge must point to the evidence in the record 
supporting the calculation of loss to the victims.  975 F.2d at 
961-61.  See also United States v. Copple, 24 F.2d at 549-50.  In 
Logar, the district court, without identifying any record 
support, accepted the government's suggestion that $10 million 
(which was the loss to investors estimated in the Presentence 
Investigation Report) would constitute an appropriate amount of 
11 
restitution.  We held that this was error and that a remand was 
necessary.   
 Here, although the amount of the actual loss was 
disputed, the district court accepted the figure that had been 
calculated by the probation department because this figure was 
based upon documentation that the probation department had 
received from the financial institutions that suffered loss.0 
                                                           
0
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI), has 
documented $46,692.91 in losses to the victims.  Specifically 
they can be broken down further: 
 
South Carolina National Bank, 1628 Browning 
Road Annex Building, Columbia, South Carolina 
29226        - $16,804.17 
 
First Union National Bank, P.O. Box 3008, 
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 - $4,992.70 
 
Trust Company Bank, Security Department, P.O. 
Box 4418, Atlanta, Georgia 27602 - $500.00 
 
Mid-Atlantic National Bank (Continental Bank 
is a subsidiary), P.O. Box 600 Edison, N.J. 
08818    - $2,311.43 
 
Firstrust Savings Bank, 1931 Cottman Avenue, 
Philadelphia, PA 19111  - $4,950.00 
 
Nations Bank of North Carolina, P.O. Box 
27287, Raleigh, N.C. 27611-7287 - $3,504.89 
 
Merchants Bank/Fidelity Bank, 26 South 
Seventh Street, Allentown, PA 18101 
      - $8,136.78 
 
Mellon/PSFS Melon Independence Center, 701 
Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106 
      - $2,709.00 
 
Corestates, P.O. Box 7618, Philadelphia PA 
19101, Attention F.C.121020 - $2,291.02 
 
Germantown Savings Bank, 1 Belmont Avenue, 
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004   - $400.00 
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This information had previously been supplied to and verified by 
the FBI.  (App. 52-54).  Accordingly, the district court did not 
err in relying on this information in its determination of the 
amount of restitution.0  
 
III. 
 Graham contends next that his sentencing hearing was 
improperly tainted by allegations that were raised without notice 
to him or the opportunity to respond or challenge their accuracy, 
in violation of Graham's statutory and constitutional rights.0 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Commonwealth Federal Savings Bank, P.O. Box 
2190, 70 Valley Stream Parkway, Valley Forge, 
PA 19482    - $92.92 
0
 Graham also contends that the district court erred in 
not crediting Graham with the value of property already seized in 
an allegedly related forfeiture proceeding.  At his sentencing 
hearing, Graham requested that the value of an automobile, a 
Jaguar which was forfeited by the FBI, should be utilized to 
reduce the outstanding and unreimbursed losses suffered by the 
victims of Graham's crime.  The district court did not offset the 
aggregate amount of restitution that Graham and his co-defendants 
were jointly and severally liable for by the value of the car, 
apparently because the car belong to Graham's sister and because 
it had been forfeited in a separate proceeding by the FBI. 
Because we have no record of the forfeiture proceeding, we have 
no record from which to review this claim.  (App. 55-56). 
 
 Graham's remaining contention that, based upon the 
facts of this case, the imposition of the restitution order was 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, and therefore, 
violative of the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive 
fines is without merit. 
0
 Unlike the concurring opinion, we believe our 
jurisdiction to review Graham's sentence lies pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) because Graham has 
alleged that his sentence was imposed in violation of law, that 
is, in violation of his constitutional rights. 
 
 This case is unlike the situation confronting us in 
United States v. Perakis, 937 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1991), in which 
13 
Apparently, one half-hour prior to the imposition of Graham's 
sentence, Graham's codefendant, David Lee Wells, was sentenced in 
a separate proceeding.  At Wells' sentencing, Wells' attorney 
advised the court: 
He [Wells] placed himself at some risk of 
danger by cooperating and in fact was 
threatened at some point in the case.  One of 
the agents, Mr. Henry, is here today, helped 
to find Mr. Wells a hotel in New Jersey where 
he stayed for a while when a threat was made 
from the lead co-defendant and in fact 
encouraged and was fully aware that Mr. Wells 
was going down south to live with family for 
most of the summer and the reason for that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
we were asked to review a sentencing court's discretionary 
refusal to impose a substitute detention under the Guidelines 
(section 5C1.1(c)(2)) and is also unlike the situation in United 
States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1990), in which we 
lacked jurisdiction over Denardi's appeal from a sentencing 
decision because that appeal was based on the district court's 
discretionary refusal to depart downward from the sentencing 
guidelines.  Because Graham does not challenge the district 
court's discretion to set a sentence anywhere within a properly 
calculated guidelines range, Denardi, supra, Perakis, supra and 
the cases cited in the concurring opinion from other courts of 
appeals (footnote 1, p. __ infra) are not implicated here.yUnlike 
the concurring opinion, we believe our jurisdiction to review 
Graham's sentence lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a)(1) because Graham has alleged that his sentence was 
imposed in violation of law, that is, in violation of his 
constitutional rights. 
 
 This case is unlike the situation confronting us in 
United States v. Perakis, 937 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1991), in which 
we were asked to review a sentencing court's discretionary 
refusal to impose a substitute detention under the Guidelines 
(section 5C1.1(c)(2)) and is also unlike the situation in United 
States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1990), in which we 
lacked jurisdiction over Denardi's appeal from a sentencing 
decision because that appeal was based on the district court's 
discretionary refusal to depart downward from the sentencing 
guidelines.  Because Graham does not challenge the district 
court's discretion to set a sentence anywhere within a properly 
calculated guidelines range, Denardi, supra, Perakis, supra and 
the cases cited in the concurring opinion from other courts of 
appeals (footnote 1, p. __ infra) are not implicated here. 
14 
was so that he could be protected from any 
danger to himself because of his cooperation. 
 
App. 68.  (During Wells' sentencing Graham is referred to as the 
lead co-defendant.  Id.)  Graham believes that this information 
was prejudicial to him because when Graham was subsequently 
sentenced, he was sentenced to a term of forty-six months, the 
maximum sentence within his Guidelines range. 
 We reject Graham's suggestion that his sentence was 
impermissibly tainted by Wells' sentencing proceeding.  There is 
nothing in the record of Graham's sentencing hearing that 
suggests that the district court relied on the statements 
proffered during Wells' sentencing hearing in imposing Graham's 
sentence.  (App. 65-70).  We are confident that experienced 
district judges are able to avoid the influence of inappropriate, 
irrelevant or extraneous information.   
 Because we do not think that the record in this case 
establishes a violation of Graham's confrontation or due process 
rights, we do not need to explore here the parameters of a 
criminal defendant's confrontation and due process rights at the 
sentencing stage.   
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IV. 
 Graham's final assertion relates to the application of 
the Criminal Justice Act in this case.  The provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976), govern the 
payment of claims for compensation for services rendered and 
expenses incurred by attorneys appointed to represent federal 
defendants financially unable to obtain counsel.  Where 
representation is furnished before a district court, a claim for 
compensation and reimbursement, supported by a sworn written 
statement, is submitted to that court.  § 3006A(d)(4).  Pursuant 
to section 3006A(d)(4) the district court "shall fix the 
compensation and reimbursement to be paid to the attorney ...." 
Id.  The Criminal Justice Act limits compensation to specified 
maximum amounts.  § 3006A(d)(2).  Payments in excess of these 
amounts may be made, however "for extended or complex 
representation whenever the court in which the representation was 
rendered . . . certifies that the amount of the excess payment is 
necessary to provide fair compensation and the payment is 
approved by the chief judge of the circuit."  § 3006A(d)(3).   
 Graham contends that his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was denied due to the district court's implementation of 
the Criminal Justice Act here which included delays in the 
disbursement of legal fees to court appointed counsel and an 
award of compensation which was substantially less than counsel's 
actual costs for representing Graham in this case. 
Notwithstanding defense counsel's apparent dissatisfaction with 
the timing and amount of his fee award under the Criminal Justice 
16 
Act, the present record reveals that this did not impact upon the 
representation Graham received. 
 Thus, counsel's attempt to convince us to review the 
payment of his legal fees under the Criminal Justice Act as 
violative of Graham's Sixth Amendment rights must fail.  To the 
extent that counsel is personally dissatisfied with the fee 
awarded by the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3006A(d)(3), 
we note that this is not the proper forum for counsel's claims.0  
We do not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an award 
of compensation and expenses under the Criminal Justice Act.  In 
Landano v. Rafferty, 859 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1988), we held that a 
district court's order denying counsel's request for retroactive 
appointment and waiver of the maximum allowable fee under the 
Criminal Justice Act constituted rulings which ultimately 
implicated the amount of compensation to be allowed counsel by 
the district judge and as such were rulings that were not final 
decisions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1291 because the 
district court's decision determining the amount of compensation 
is essentially administrative in nature. Accordingly, we will 
dismiss this claim for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
V. 
                                                           
0
 If counsel is dissatisfied with the fee awarded by the 
court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3), counsel should seek 
reconsideration of the award before the district court.  
17 
 For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the Judgment 
in a Criminal Case entered by the district court and remand for 
resentencing. 
18 
 
United States v. Graham, No. 94-1370  
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I write separately because I conclude that we should 
not consider the issue the majority reaches in Section III of its 
opinion.   
 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) provides that a defendant may only 
file a notice of appeal of a sentence when it is imposed: (1) in 
violation of law; (2) through an incorrect application of the 
guideline; (3) in excess of the guidelines; or (4) where there is 
no guideline and the sentence is plainly unreasonable.  None of 
those four conditions apply here. 
 Graham was sentenced to prison for a term of 46 months, 
a sentence within, albeit at the top of, his guideline range.  He 
does not allege error in the calculation of his guideline range, 
nor that his presentence investigation report contained anything 
improper.  Moreover, he does not take issue with the sentencing 
guideline range of 37 to 46 months and concedes that the district 
court sentenced him within the appropriate guideline range. 
 Graham only speculates on appeal that the district 
court may have considered factors to which Graham did not have an 
opportunity to respond.  Inasmuch as the sentencing range is 
under 24 months, the district court was not required to give 
reasons for its decision to sentence Graham at the top of the 
guideline range.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).  Nonetheless, even 
following an independent review of the record, I cannot find 
19 
evidence of any impropriety that would allow us to speculate that 
the district court may have violated the law in sentencing 
Graham.  Hence, I conclude that Graham has failed to show any 
error that satisfies the requisites of 18 U.S.C § 3742(a).  
 Section 3742 is a gatekeeping provision.  Congress 
provided it to establish "a limited practice of appellate review 
of sentences in the Federal criminal justice system" (emphasis 
supplied), that would "preserve the concept that the discretion 
of a sentencing judge has a proper place in sentencing and should 
not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate court."  S. 
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 149-50 (1983), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3332-33. 
 My view of the limited appellate review of guideline 
sentences is further supported in the legislative history of 
§3742: 
Appellate courts have long followed the 
principle that sentences imposed by district 
courts within legal limits should not be 
disturbed. . . .  [The Sentencing Reform Act 
is] intended to afford enough guidance and 
control of the exercise of [district court] 
discretion to promote fairness and 
rationality, and to reduce unwarranted 
disparity, in sentencing.  Section 3742 
accommodates all of these considerations by 
making appellate review of sentences 
available equally to the defendant and the 
government, and by confining it to cases in 
which the sentences are illegal, are imposed 
as the result of an incorrect application of 
the sentencing guidelines, or are outside the 
range specified in the guidelines and 
unreasonable. 
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S. Rep. No. 225, supra, at 150, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3333 
(footnote omitted). 
 In United States v. Perakis, 937 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 
1991), we held that we did not have jurisdiction to review a 
sentencing court's discretionary refusal to grant substitute 
detention under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(c)(2).  We held that unless one 
of the "four necessary circumstances exist to permit . . . 
appeal," we do not have jurisdiction to review a district court's 
decision as long as its sentence remains within the boundaries of 
the guidelines.  937 F.2d at 111.  In Perakis we were following 
the lead of United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3d 
Cir. 1989), in which we held that § 3742(a) does not authorize an 
appeal from a district court's discretionary refusal to depart 
from the applicable guidelines range. 
 Although the precise issue presented to us here was not 
decided in either Perakis or Denardi, once we determine that the 
district court committed no error of law, I suggest that both 
cases counsel against affirming the district court with regard to 
the allegation of error addressed in this portion of the appeal. 
I would dismiss the appeal with respect to this allegation of 
error, rather than affirm the judgment of the district court.  In 
reaching this conclusion, I would join eight other courts of 
appeals that have similarly decided the question.0   
                                                           
0See United States v. Garrido, 38 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Mihm, 13 F.3d 1200, 1205 (8th Cir. 1994) 
("Because the district court then imposed a sentence within the 
range, we have no jurisdiction to review the sentence."); United 
States v. Woodrum, 959 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 
("A sentence is not reviewable merely because it is at the top of 
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a properly calculated Guideline range."); United States v. Lopez, 
974 F.2d 50, 53 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Courts have great flexibility 
in picking a sentence within the range."); United States v. 
Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990) ("We are unwilling 
to scrutinize sentencing justifications offered by a district 
court when the sentence is within an admittedly appropriate range 
unless those justifications implicate 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) or 
(2)."); United States v. Vega-Encarnacion, 914 F.2d 20, 25 (1st 
Cir. 1990) (We have "no appellate jurisdiction to consider a 
sentence that was within the applicable guideline range and was 
correctly determined."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977 (1991); 
United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Pelayo-Bautista, 907 F.2d 99, 101-102 (9th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(The legislative history "further implies that Congress did not 
intend to allow an appeal from a sentence within the 
Guidelines."); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2nd 
Cir. 1989) ("Congress's failure to provide appellate review of 
sentences within the Guidelines correctly calculated was thus a 
conscious decision consistent with its overall purpose. . . .  If 
not inexorable, the provision of appellate review solely for 
departures is understandable. . . .  Sentences within the 
Guidelines may be deemed to be reasonable and within the 
exclusive discretion of the sentencing court solely because of 
the Commission's blessing of the permissible range."), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989).  The Eleventh Circuit has taken a 
unique approach, although the effect is identical.  See United 
States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir. 1989) (A sentence 
is a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
hence, we have jurisdiction.  18 U.S.C. § 3742 "does not regulate 
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over appeals 
themselves; rather section 3742 defines the claims that the 
courts of appeals may hear in reviewing an appeal.").  See also 
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(a) ("A sentence conforms with the guidelines for 
imprisonment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the 
applicable guidelines range."). 
